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We show that household leverage as of 2006 is a powerful statistical predictor of the severity of the
2007 to 2009 recession across U.S. counties. Counties in the U.S. that experienced a large increase
in household leverage from 2002 to 2006 showed a sharp relative decline in durable consumption starting
in the third quarter of 2006 – a full year before the official beginning of the recession in the fourth
quarter of 2007. Similarly, counties with the highest reliance on credit card borrowing reduced durable
consumption by significantly more following the financial crisis of the fall of 2008. Overall, our statistical
model shows that household leverage growth and dependence on credit card borrowing as of 2006
explain a large fraction of the overall consumer default, house price, unemployment, residential investment,
and durable consumption patterns during the recession. Our findings suggest that a focus on household
finance may help elucidate the sources macroeconomic fluctuations.
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Understanding the sources of deep recessions is the holy grail of macroeconomics. The 
most recent recession has produced a sharp increase in unemployment and a large decline in 
GDP (Figure I, top two panels). What factors explain the current economic downturn? This paper 
focuses on the role of household leverage. We show that household leverage measured as of 
2006 is an early and powerful statistical predictor of cross-sectional county-level variation in 
household default, house price, unemployment, residential investment, and durable consumption 
from 2007 to 2009. Any realistic macroeconomic theory of the 2007 recession must be consistent 
with the time-series and cross-sectional patterns documented in this paper.  
The aggregate U.S. evidence highlights the potential importance of household leverage. 
The bottom panel of Figure 1 shows the unprecedented increase in the U.S. household debt to 
income ratio during the years prior to the recession. In 2007, the household debt to GDP ratio 
reached its highest level since the onset of the Great Depression. The initial indicators of 
economic difficulty, namely a rise in household defaults and a decline in house prices, were also 
related to household leverage. These trends began as early as the second quarter of 2006, a full 
five quarters before the initial increase in the unemployment rate. The components of GDP that 
initially declined in 2007 and early 2008 were fixed residential investment and durable 
consumption—two components that most heavily rely on the willingness of households to obtain 
additional debt financing. 
  While aggregate patterns are suggestive, it is difficult to reach definitive conclusions on 
the link between household leverage and the economy based on aggregate data alone. For 
example, it is possible that the decline in house prices and the increase in defaults in 2006 
reflected an anticipation of future unemployment. Or perhaps the household-leverage component 
of the recession, while occurring early in the downturn, is far less important than the credit crisis 2 
 
of September and October of 2008. More generally, the linkages across the economy make it 
difficult to conclude based on aggregate evidence alone what factors contributed the most to the 
severe recession of 2007 to 2009. 
  Our focus on cross-sectional variation across U.S. counties in the severity of the 
recession helps to overcome some of the difficulties associated with aggregate data. There is a 
large degree of such variation across counties. For example, Saint Lucie County in Florida 
experienced an increase in the unemployment rate of 6.6% from 2006 to 2008. In contrast, Harris 
County in Texas, where Houston is located, had a rise of only 1.2% in the unemployment rate. 
Our empirical methodology examines patterns across U.S. counties to explore why some 
counties have experienced a much more severe recession than others. 
  We sort counties according to the increase in the household debt to income ratio from 
2002 to 2006, and we refer to counties with large (small) increases in leverage during this period 
as high (low) leverage growth counties. We find that the recession both began earlier and became 
more severe in high leverage growth counties relative to low leverage growth counties. The top 
10% leverage growth counties experienced an increase in the household default rate of 12 
percentage points and a decline in house prices of 40% from the second quarter of 2006 through 
the second quarter of 2009. In contrast, the bottom 10% leverage growth counties experienced a 
modest increase of 3 percentage points in the default rate and a 10% increase in house prices. 
Auto sales and new housing building permits reveal a similar pattern. By the third quarter 
of 2008, auto sales in the top 10% leverage growth counties declined by almost 40% relative to 
2005. In contrast, auto sales in the bottom 10% leverage growth counties were actually up almost 
20%. From 2005 to 2008, new housing building permits declined by almost 150% in high 
leverage growth counties while declining only 50% in low leverage growth counties. To the best 3 
 
of our knowledge, we are the first to examine durable consumption and residential investment 
patterns across U.S. counties during a recession, and the first to show the link between household 
leverage and the decline in these variables. 
The final measure of economic activity we examine is the unemployment rate. Similar to 
the pattern in auto sales, the unemployment rate increased in high leverage growth counties 
much earlier than low leverage counties. From the fourth quarter of 2005 to the third quarter of 
2008, the unemployment rate climbed 2.5 percentage points in the top 10% leverage growth 
counties; in contrast, the bottom 10% leverage growth counties experienced no change in 
unemployment. 
The evidence suggests that both the timing and the severity of the recession were related 
to the increase in household leverage from 2002 to 2006. Counties that experienced a large 
increase in their debt to income ratio before the onset of the downturn were precisely the 
counties that experienced the sharpest decline in durable consumption and the largest increase in 
unemployment. We also show that the correlation between leverage growth and the severity of 
the recession is robust to county-level control variables for demographics, cyclicality, and 
industrial composition. 
While counties with low leverage largely escaped the recession up to the third quarter of 
2008, auto sales drop and unemployment skyrocket in both high and low leverage growth 
counties from the fourth quarter of 2008 through the second quarter of 2009. In other words, the 
growth household leverage from 2002 to 2006 is not correlated with the severity of the downturn 
across U.S. counties during the last three quarters of the recession. 
In the last section of our analysis, we examine what factors other than household leverage 
growth from 2002 to 2006 are correlated with acceleration of the recession from the fourth 4 
 
quarter of 2008 to the second quarter of 2009. We find that the severity of the downturn in these 
three quarters is correlated with an alternative measure of household leverage: household 
exposure to short term credit, as measured by the credit card utilization rate as of 2006. High 
credit card utilization rate counties experienced a sharper drop in auto sales from the fourth 
quarter of 2008 through the second quarter of 2009. This coincides with a sharp reduction in 
credit card availability that occurs simultaneously with the financial crisis in September and 
October of 2008. 
Our findings suggest that households faced a one-two punch during the recession. From 
the fourth quarter of 2006 to the third quarter of 2008, an over-levered household sector facing 
mounting defaults and falling house prices pulled back on durable consumption and experienced 
higher unemployment rates. From the fourth quarter of 2008 onwards, credit-card dependent 
consumers reduced consumption as credit card availability was cut dramatically. 
We assess the statistical magnitude of the household leverage effect by using our 
estimated regression coefficients to predict the severity of the recession across the household 
leverage distribution. Using this methodology, we find that the growth in household leverage 
from 2002 to 2006 and household dependence on credit card borrowing as of 2006 are 
quantitatively sufficient to statistically explain the entire rise in household defaults, the drop in 
house prices, and the drop in auto sales. Our factors also explain about a fifth of the overall rise 
in unemployment. The reduced explanatory power for unemployment is a natural outcome of the 
fact that goods consumed in one location are often produced in different locations, therefore 
naturally lowering the correlation between local consumption and production shocks.
1  
                                                            
1 For example, reduced recreational vehicle (RV) sales in Los Angeles County due to household leverage may lead 
to a sharp increase in unemployment in Elkhart County, Indiana, even though Elkhart County has low household 
leverage. 5 
 
Overall, our findings suggest that household balance sheets are a crucial component of 
explaining macroeconomic fluctuations. The idea that household debt instigates and exacerbates 
economic downturns goes back to Fisher (1933), and is reiterated in subsequent research by 
Mishkin (1978), King (1994), Leamer (2007, 2009), and Glick and Lansing (2009, 2010)). 
Leamer (2007, 2009) points out that eight of the past ten recessions were preceded by substantial 
problems in housing and consumer durables. Our paper provides the first micro-level cross-
sectional evidence based on the 2007 to 2009 recession of the link between household balance 
sheets and an economic downturn.
2 
Our empirical findings should also serve as a useful metric for guiding theoretical work 
on understanding business cycle fluctuations. Standard DSGE models of business cycles often 
ignore the role of financial markets (see Tovar 2008). While this has changed more recently (see 
e.g. Christiano et al  2007), the emphasis has been on firm and bank level, not household level
3.  
Our work on the other hand points to the potential importance of household balance 
sheets in explaining macroeconomic fluctuations. While more research is needed to determine 
whether household leverage was a catalyst of the recession or an amplification of other variables, 
such as technology or monetary shocks, any explanation of the recession of 2007 to 2009 must 
be consistent with the strong correlation between household leverage and subsequent economic 
outcomes in the cross-section of U.S. counties. 
Our results are closely related to the persistent business cycle fact that residential 
investment and durable consumption are strong leading indicators of business cycles. This 
finding deserves closer scrutiny by theoretical work. While many macro models predict that 
investment is a leading indicator of business cycles, most have difficulty in explaining why 
                                                            
2 In a concurrent analysis, Glick and Lansing (2010) find similar results in the cross-section of western countries. 
3 Iacovello (2005) is an important exception. 6 
 
household investment should leads business investment over the business cycle. This difficultly 
is recognized by Jonas Fisher (2001) as a “potent challenge to real business cycle theory”.   
The rest of the study proceeds as follows. In the next section, we provide aggregate 
evidence on the importance of household leverage. In Section 2, we describe the county-level 
data and provide summary statistics. In Section 3, we focus on the relation between leverage 
growth from 2002 to 2006 and economic outcomes from 2006 to 2009. Section 4 explores 
alternative hypotheses and shows how credit card-reliant borrowers responded to the financial 
crisis of the fall of 2008. Section 5 presents our magnitude estimation, and Section 6 concludes. 
 
Section 1. Household Leverage and the Real Economy 
A. The Origins of Household Leverage 
  What factors led to the dramatic expansion in household leverage from 2001 to 2007? 
This is the central question of two of our previous studies. In Mian and Sufi (2009a), we argue 
that the advent of subprime mortgage securitization represented a credit supply shock that 
provided new home purchase financing for a segment of the population that traditionally was 
unable to obtain mortgages. We are agnostic on the source of the credit supply shock—it is likely 
that government programs (Leonnig (2008)), moral hazard on behalf of originators and servicers 
of securitization pools (Keys, Mukherjee, Seru, and Vig (2010), and the enormous capital 
inflows into the United States (Obstfeld and Rogoff (2009)) all played some role. We present 
evidence that the credit supply shock led to an increase in house prices, which led to an 
important collateral feedback effect: once collateral values increased, lenders were willing to 
lend even more to households (Kiyotaki and Moore (1997)). 7 
 
  In Mian and Sufi (2009b), we focus on existing homeowners who owned their homes 
before the credit supply shock. We find that existing homeowners responded to house price 
growth by borrowing heavily against the increase in the value of their home equity. We find that 
homeowners borrowed 25 to 30 cents on every dollar of home value appreciation, and that this 
home equity-based borrowing channel accounts for a substantial fraction of the increase in 
homeowner debt from 2002 to 2006. 
  To summarize, two related factors are responsible for the rise in household leverage 
between 2001 and 2007. First, an expansion in the supply of credit (as opposed to a productivity 
driven demand side shock) pulled new buyers into the housing market, pushing house prices up 
in the process. Second, the increase in house prices and low interest rates enticed existing 
homeowners to extract cash from their home equity. 
B. Household Leverage and the Real Economy 
  Following the historic rise in household leverage, the top panel in Figure 2 shows that 
beginning in the second quarter of 2006, default rates began to rise and house prices began to 
fall. As early as the second quarter of 2007—two months before the beginning of the current 
recession—default rates were already above the levels they had reached in the 2001 recession. 
By the second quarter of 2009, the default rate neared 10%, which is twice as high as any point 
since 1991. Total delinquent debt as of the second quarter of 2009 was $1.7 trillion.
4 
  The process of household de-leveraging began in the second quarter of 2008 (lower 
panel). Households cut back on consumption as the personal savings rate reached 5.2% in the 
second quarter of 2009 - the highest it has been in over a decade. As early as the fourth quarter of 
                                                            
4 Throughout, the household default rate refers to the default rate on all household debt, including housing- and non-
housing-related debt. In our sample as of 2006, housing-related debt (mortgages and home equity lines) is on 
average 80% of total debt across U.S. counties. Further, a regression of housing-related default rates on total default 
rates yields and R
2 of 0.98. In other words, most of the variation across counties in household default rates is driven 
by variation in housing-related default rates. 8 
 
2007, debt growth began to moderate. From the fourth quarter of 2008 to the second quarter of 
2009, total household debt declined for three straight quarters—something that had not 
previously occurred in the past 60 years for which quarterly data are available. 
Why did mortgage defaults begin to rise and house prices begin to fall in the middle of 
2006? This question is beyond the scope of our analysis, but we offer three potential reasons. 
First, rising interest rates likely played a role in reducing house prices by lowering the relative 
advantage of homeownership (Mayer and Hubbard (2008)). Second, lending standards on 
mortgages deteriorated to such a degree that mortgages originated in 2006 experienced 
shockingly high default rates almost immediately after origination (Demyanyk and Van Hemert 
(2008)). Third, even small increases in default rates may have shut down securitization markets, 
leading to an amplification effect on default rates as households were unable to refinance. 
One thing is certain: the rise in mortgage defaults and collapse in house prices preceded 
the aggregate rise in the unemployment rate. Figure 3 shows that the increase in default rates (top 
panel) and decrease in house prices (bottom panel) started five quarters before any increase in 
the aggregate unemployment rate. 
  Figure 4 shows the decline in real activity. Starting in the first quarter of 2006, residential 
fixed investment growth began to plummet. By the fourth quarter of 2007, residential fixed 
investment had declined almost 50% from its 2005 level. In contrast, non-residential fixed 
investment showed robust growth until the third quarter of 2008. The middle panel of Figure 4 
shows a similar pattern for durable consumption, which leveled off in 2007 before experiencing 
sharp declines through 2008. Non-durable and service consumption remained strong until the 
end of 2008. 9 
 
  The bottom panel of Figure 4 shows monthly retail sales; as it shows, the drop in durable 
consumption (motor vehicles, and furniture and appliances) began very early in the recession. 
The drop in auto sales was particularly large—from the fourth quarter of 2007 to the fourth 
quarter of 2008, auto sales dropped by 30%. The drop in non-durable consumption both began 
later and was far less severe. 
  Figure 4 shows that the initial part of the economic downturn was driven by declines in 
durable consumption and residential investment. This is common in post World War II 
recessions (Leamer (2007, 2009)). The early drops in these two GDP components during the 
2007 to 2009 recession occurred simultaneously with an extremely large increase in household 
defaults. Given the importance of credit in the purchase of durable goods and housing, there is a 
suggestive link between deterioration of household balance sheets and the early decline in 
durable and housing consumption. 
While the aggregate patterns are suggestive of a link between household leverage and the 
recession, we urge caution in the interpretation of the evidence. A main disadvantage of 
aggregate data is the inability to distinguish between competing hypotheses that imply similar 
time series patterns in aggregate activity. For example, residential investment and durable 
consumption may have declined given expectations of future unemployment increases. In the 
next section, we begin our analysis of the cross-section of U.S. counties to provide further 
evidence on the link between household leverage and the 2007 to 2009 recession. 
 
Section 2. County-Level Data and Summary Statistics 
  We build the county-level data set from a variety of sources. Information on household 
debt, default rates, and credit scores comes from Equifax zip code level aggregates. Data on 10 
 
house prices come from the FHFA MSA level house price indices, which are subsequently 
matched to counties. Zip code level income information is available from the IRS, and zip code 
level demographics are from the 2000 Decennial Census. More information on these data sets is 
available in the appendix of Mian and Sufi (2009a). The zip code level data in Equifax are 
aggregated to the county level by weighting each zip code by the fraction of all consumers with a 
credit report in the county living in the zip code. The IRS and Census zip code level data are 
aggregated to the county level using the number of households in the 2000 census as weights. 
  There are four new county-level data sets that we do not employ in our previous studies. 
The first includes auto sales data from R.L. Polk. Polk is an automotive intelligence company 
that provides detailed auto sales data to a variety of customers. The data are collected by 
examining new vehicle registrations at the county level. The data are available from 2004 to 
2009 at a quarterly frequency, and they cover every county in the United States.
5 County-level 
unemployment data are from the Bureau of Labor Statistics, who provide quarterly 
unemployment rate data for all U.S. counties. We use county business patterns data from the 
Census Bureau to construct industry composition of employment for each county. The business 
patterns data records payroll and employment data by industry for each county and is available 
with a three year lag. New housing permits also come from the Census Bureau.
6 
  While there are 3,138 counties in the U.S., we restrict our attention to the top 450 
counties in the U.S. by population. These are counties with at least 50,000 resident households, 
which cover 70% of the U.S. population and 82% of the aggregate debt outstanding as of the end 
of 2005. Since our focus is on county-level analysis in this paper, we drop the very small 
counties that add significant measurement error. All of our results are unchanged if we include 
                                                            
5 These data are available for purchase from R.L. Polk. For pricing information and purchase, please contact Robert 
Sacka at robert_sacka@polk.com, and mention the county-level quarterly auto sales data used in this study. 
6County-level census data are available at: http://www2.census.gov/prod2/statcomp/usac/excel/ 11 
 
small counties, but give them their appropriate statistical weight by weighing by county 
population.
7 
Every state and the District of Columbia are represented by the counties in our sample, 
with the exception of Wyoming. To get a sense of the counties included, we list in the Appendix 
Table every fifth county in our final sample, where the counties are sorted inversely according to 
the change in the debt to income ratio from 2002 to 2006 (i.e., counties with the largest increase 
in the debt to income ratio are listed first). 
  Table 1 presents summary statistics for the final sample of 450 counties. The key variable 
of interest in our study is the increase in the debt to income ratio across counties from 2002 to 
2006. The average debt to income increase across counties from 2002 to 2006 was 0.8. The 
average debt to income ratio as of 2001 was 2.2 with a standard deviation of 0.5, which implies 
that the increase from 2002 to 2006 was more than one full standard deviation of the 2001 level. 
  The average increase in the default rates of counties from the fourth quarter of 2006 to 
the second quarter of 2009 was 0.043, which is almost three times as large as one standard 
deviation of the 2006 level. House prices collapsed from 2006 to 2009, with the average decline 
across counties in our sample of 14%. House price data are only available for 123 counties; this 
reflects the limits of the coverage of MSAs by FHFA.  
Table 1 also shows that auto sales plummeted by an average of 32% from the fourth 
quarter of 2006 to the second quarter of 2009. Over the same time period, the unemployment rate 
increased by an average of 5.4 percentage points, which is more than 4 times a standard 
                                                            
7 The results using the full sample and equally weighting counties are qualitatively similar but are smaller in 
magnitude. This is consistent with higher measurement error in very small counties. Consistent with this 
explanation, the R
2 of equally weighted regressions using the full sample are only between 1/3 and 1/2 as large as 
the R
2 of population weighted regressions using the full sample. 12 
 
deviation of the 2006 level. Table 1 also includes information on Census demographics and 
county business patterns across the 450 counties in our sample. 
 
Section 3. Household Leverage and the Real Economy: County-Level Analysis 
   In this section, we examine how household leverage growth in a given county from 2002 
to 2006 is correlated with the timing and severity of the recession in the county from 2006 to 
2009. As we show, counties with the largest increases in household leverage experienced the 
earliest and most severe downturns in economic activity. 
A. Methodology 
  There are five county-level economic outcomes we evaluate: mortgage default rates, 
house price growth, auto sales, new housing building permits, and unemployment. The goal of 
our methodology is to see how the increase in leverage from 2002 to 2006 in a given county is 
correlated with these county-level outcomes during the recession. We first split the sample into 
high and low leverage growth counties. High leverage growth counties are counties in the top 
10% of the distribution of the increase in the debt to income ratio from 2002 to 2006. For 
example, Merced County in California experienced an increase in its aggregate debt to income of 
2.3 from 2002 to 2006. Low leverage growth counties are counties in the bottom 10% of the 
same distribution. For example, Tarrant County in Texas experienced almost no increase in its 
debt to income ratio from 2002 to 2006. Once we split the sample into high and low leverage 
growth counties, we present figures that plot each economic outcome from the fourth quarter of 
2004 to the end of the sample. This technique shows both the timing and severity of the 
downturn in high versus low leverage growth counties. 13 
 
  Our second approach is to present figures that contain the county-level scatter plot of the 
change in each economic outcome during the recession against the rise in leverage that preceded 
the recession. For example, for each county, we plot the increase in the unemployment rate from 
the fourth quarter of 2006 to second quarter of 2009 against the rise in household leverage from 
the fourth quarter of 2002 to the fourth quarter of 2006. 
  Third, for each outcome, we present a series of first difference regressions with county-
level control variables. The following equation represents the general form of the first difference 
specifications: 
               06 4_09 2                      02 4_06 4    Γ                                 (1) 
where EconomicOutcome06q4_09q2 represents the change in the outcome (house prices, default 
rates, unemployment, and auto sales) for county i from the fourth quarter of 2006 to the second 
quarter of 2009, LeverageGrowth02q4_06q4 represents the increase in the debt to income ratio 
in county i from the fourth quarter of 2002 to the fourth quarter of 2006, and ControlVariables is 
a set of cyclicality, demographic, and industrial composition measures for county i. In estimating 
specification (1), we weight by the total number of households in the county as of 2000 to 
account for the fact that variables measured over smaller populations have larger variance. We 
also report unweighted regression results in all our tables. Standard errors in all specification are 
clustered at the state level. 
In the regression specifications, we choose to measure household leverage growth up to 
2006 because it reflects when the household leverage cycle shifted from expansion to 
contraction. As Figure 2 above shows, the decline in house prices and the increase in household 
defaults began in 2006. Although the recession did not formally begin until the fourth quarter of 
2007 according to the NBER, we choose to measure economic outcomes from the fourth quarter 
of 2006 because default rates increased rapidly and house priced declined sharply in 2007. All 14 
 
results are qualitatively and quantitatively similar if we measure outcomes from the fourth 
quarter of 2007. Further, as mentioned above, we plot all outcomes for high and low leverage 
growth counties from 2004 onwards in order to show the exact timing of economic outcomes.   
In most of our empirical tests, we take the variation across counties in leverage growth 
from 2002 to 2006 as given. In other words, we do not attempt to discern why some counties 
experienced sharper increases in household leverage than others. This issue is addressed in our 
previous studies. In both Mian and Sufi (2009a) and Mian and Sufi (2009b), we show that an 
aggregate credit supply shock beginning in 2002 shifted the demand for housing across the 
country. The degree to which house prices increased in respond to this housing demand shock 
depended crucially on the slope of the housing supply curve. In counties with relatively elastic 
housing supply, house prices were relatively steady as home-builders responded to the demand 
shock by constructing more homes. In counties with relatively inelastic housing supply, house 
prices increased given the difficulty in constructing more homes to meet new demand. 
As a corollary, as counties with inelastic housing  supply experienced sharper increases in 
house prices, existing homeowners aggressively borrowed against the value of their homes 
(Mian and Sufi (2009b)) and new homeowners were forced to take out larger mortgages to buy 
more expensive homes (Mian and Sufi (2009a)). The primary measure of housing supply 
elasticity we use in the previous studies comes from Saiz (2008), who constructs his measure 
based on geographical and topographical constraints on house construction. 
The impact of housing supply elasticity on leverage growth is quite strong: a county level 
regression of the increase in the debt to income ratio from 2002 to 2006 on the Saiz (2008) 
measure of housing supply inelasticity shows a strongly positive correlation with an R
2 of almost 15 
 
0.2. This motivates our final test of the relation between leverage growth and economic 
outcomes, which is the following instrumental variables specification: 
               06 4_09 2                      02 4_06 4      Γ                            (2) 
              02 4_06 4                                     Θ                            (3) 
Where equation (3) represents the first stage in which leverage growth is regressed on the Saiz 
(2008) measure of housing supply inelasticity. The second stage is identified using the predicted 
values of LeverageGrowth02q4_06q4 for each county. We examine the exclusion restriction in 
great detail in our previous work, and we come to the conclusion that differential patterns in 
economic outcomes in the IV specification above come through house price growth and its effect 
on household leverage. 
B. Default Rates and House Prices 
  Figure 5A shows differential patterns for default rates and house prices for high versus 
low leverage growth counties. Counties that experienced the largest increase in their debt to 
income ratio from 2002 to 2006 saw a tremendous rise in household default rates. Beginning in 
the second quarter of 2006, the household default rate in high leverage growth counties began to 
skyrocket. By the second quarter of 2009, the default rate increased by 12 percentage points for 
these counties. In contrast, default rates in low leverage growth counties began to rise later and 
experienced only a modest increase by 2009. By the end of the sample period, the default rate is 
almost 10 percentage points higher in high leverage growth counties relative to low leverage 
growth counties. 
  The patterns in house price growth are similar. Low leverage growth counties completely 
avoided the housing downturn. High leverage growth counties were hammered. Starting in 2006, 
house prices began to plummet in counties that had experienced the largest rise in the debt to 16 
 
income ratio from 2002 to 2006. From 2005 to the second quarter of 2009, house prices dropped 
a stunning 40% in high leverage growth counties. 
  Figure 5B shows the scatter plots for the change in these two outcome variables from 
2006 to 2009 against the increase in household leverage from 2002 to 2006. As they show, the 
increase in household leverage before the recession in a given county strongly predicts the 
severity of the subsequent default and housing crisis within the same county. The magnitudes are 
very large: the regression line implies that a one standard deviation increase in leverage growth 
from 2002 to 2006 leads to a 2/3 standard deviation increase in subsequent default rates and a 2/3 
standard deviation decline in subsequent house price growth. 
  Tables 2 and 3 present the first difference regression analogs to the scatter plots, and they 
show that the correlations in Figure 5B are robust to the inclusion of control variables. In column 
1 of Table 2, the change in the debt to income ratio from 2002 to 2006 is strongly correlated with 
the increase in default rates from 2006 to 2009. This single variable gives an R
2 of 0.45, which is 
extremely high for a first-difference cross-section regression. Column 2 presents the coefficient 
estimate after weighting the observations by the number of households in the county as of 2000. 
In columns 3 and 4, we include a variety of control variables that increase the adjusted R
2 
substantially. The inclusion of control variables actually increases the size of the coefficient on 
leverage growth. Column 5 presents the IV estimate where the change in the debt to income ratio 
is instrumented using the Saiz (2008) measure of housing supply inelasticity. The IV estimate is 
considerably larger than the OLS estimate, which may be may be driven by two factors. First, the 
IV could be correcting for some measurement error in leverage growth. Second, to the extent 
some of the increase in leverage is driven by real permanent income shocks, it would tend to 
reduce ex-post differences between high and low leverage growth counties. For example, if high 17 
 
leverage growth were driven by an accurate expectation of higher income growth in future, then 
leverage growth will not be correlated with high default rates. Since our housing supply elasticity 
instrument is uncorrelated with such permanent income shock differences (see Mian and Sufi 
2009b for evidence), the IV specification corrects for the endogeneity problem. 
The coefficient in column 1 of Table 3 shows the strong negative correlation between 
leverage growth from 2002 to 2006 and subsequent house price growth. The univariate 
specification yields an R
2 of 0.62. As before, the inclusion of control variables improves the fit 
of the regression, but has almost no effect on the relation between leverage growth and house 
price growth. As with default rates, the IV estimate is larger than the OLS estimate, although the 
coefficient is not estimated precisely. 
C. Auto Sales, New Housing Permits, and Unemployment Rates 
  In Figure 6A, we plot the differential patterns in auto sales, new housing building 
permits, and unemployment rates for high versus low leverage growth counties. Counties that 
experienced the largest increase in their debt to income ratio from 2002 to 2006 saw a severe 
contraction in auto sales very early in the downturn. By the first quarter of 2008, auto sales 
dropped 20% relative to their 2005 level in high leverage growth counties. In contrast, auto sales 
were actually up in low leverage growth counties in the first quarter of 2008. In the third quarter 
of 2008, auto sales dropped in both high and low leverage growth counties, but the drop in high 
leverage growth counties was much more severe. Interestingly, all counties saw auto sales 
plummet in the fourth quarter of 2008 and the first quarter of 2009. We return to this latter fact in 
Section 4. 
  The middle panel of Figure 6A plots the differential patterns for new housing permits. 
High leverage growth counties experienced a much earlier and more severe downturn in new 18 
 
housing permit growth. At the end of 2007, new housing permits declined in counties 
experiencing a large increase in leverage from 2002 to 2006 by 75%. The decline in counties 
experiencing no increase in leverage from 2002 to 2006 was only 20%. The differential only 
increased from 2007 to 2008. 
  Perhaps the most important measure of recession severity is the unemployment rate. The 
right panel of Figure 6A shows that the rise in unemployment began much earlier in high versus 
low leverage growth counties, and the subsequent increase in unemployment was much more 
severe. As early as the middle of 2007, the unemployment rate had increased more sharply in 
counties that had experienced the largest increase in their debt to income ratios from 2002 to 
2006. 
While the unemployment rate is relatively constant in low leverage growth counties 
through the third quarter of 2008, it increases sharply from the third quarter of 2008 to the 
second quarter of 2009. This is similar to the pattern in auto sales. In other words, while 
household leverage is strongly correlated with auto sales and unemployment through the third 
quarter of 2008, all counties experience dramatic declines in auto sales and dramatic increases in 
unemployment during the last part of the recession. 
  Figure 6B presents the scatter plots of the relation between leverage growth from 2002 to 
2006 and the change in auto sales, new housing permits, and unemployment from 2006 to 2009. 
The plots show a negative correlation between leverage growth and subsequent auto sales growth 
and leverage growth and subsequent new housing permit growth. The right panel shows a 
positive correlation between leverage growth and subsequent increases in unemployment. The 
scatter plots show a significant amount of unexplained variation, which we examine in the next 
section. 19 
 
  Table 4 presents coefficients from the first difference specification of auto sales growth 
from the fourth quarter of 2006 to the second quarter of 2009 regressed on leverage growth from 
2002 to 2006. The coefficient estimate in column 2 implies that a one standard deviation increase 
in leverage growth from 2002 to 2006 in a county was associated with a ½ standard deviation 
decrease in auto sales from 2006 to 2009. The inclusion of control variables reduces the 
magnitude slightly, but the effect is still large and statistically significant. The IV specification in 
column 5 yields a coefficient estimate that is substantially larger, but less precise. 
  Table 5 replicates the specifications with the growth in new housing building permits 
from 2006 to 2008 as the left hand side variable. The coefficient in column 2 implies that a one 
standard deviation increase in leverage growth from 2002 to 2006 leads to a 1/3 standard 
deviation decrease in new housing permit growth from 2006 to 2008. The inclusion of control 
variables does not affect the estimate. The IV specification produces a larger coefficient, but it is 
measured less precisely. 
  The results on new housing building permits raise a possible “real estate construction” 
channel through which household leverage affects real economic activity: the housing boom in 
high leverage growth counties led to higher employment in real estate construction from 2002 to 
2006, and the resulting downturn is a natural response as this sector shrinks. The coefficient 
estimate in column 6 disputes this hypothesis. The estimate implies that high leverage growth 
counties experienced less residential housing construction during the housing boom than low 
leverage growth counties.
8 This is consistent with our previous research that shows that a credit-
induced housing demand shock led to more building in elastic counties (Mian and Sufi (2009b)). 
In addition, the employment share in construction and real estate as of the end of 2006 is 
                                                            
8 In an unreported specification, we include census, 2001 economic condition, and 2001 industry share control 
variables in the column 6 specification and find similar results. 20 
 
included as a control variable for all economic outcomes, and this control variable does not affect 
the estimated coefficient on leverage growth in any specification. 
  Table 6 presents coefficients from the first difference specification of the unemployment 
rate change from 2006 to 2009 regressed on leverage growth from 2002 to 2006. The coefficient 
estimate in column 2 implies that a one standard deviation increase in leverage growth from 
2002 to 2006 led to a 1/3 standard deviation increase in the unemployment rate during the 
recession. The inclusion of control variables has almost no effect on the magnitude. The IV 
estimate is even larger than the OLS estimate. 
  Taken together, these results show that a county’s expansion in household leverage from 
2002 to 2006 is a powerful statistical predictor of the severity and timing of the economic 
downturn across U.S. counties. Counties which had experienced the largest increase in their 
household debt to income ratios were precisely the counties that saw auto sales plummet and 
unemployment rates increase the most. 
 
Section 4. The Credit Crisis and the Deepening of the Recession 
  Household leverage growth from 2002 to 2006 in a county is a strong predictor of the 
decline in economic activity from the second quarter of 2006 to the third quarter of 2008. 
Counties with modest increases in debt to income ratios from 2002 to 2006 experience almost no 
decline in auto sales or increase in unemployment during the early part of the recession. 
However, as Figure 6A above shows, both high and low leverage growth counties experience a 
dramatic decline in auto sales and a dramatic increase in unemployment from the third quarter of 
2008 to the second quarter of 2009. In this section, we explore the potential relation between 
these patterns, the financial crisis, and consumer reliance on credit cards. 21 
 
A. Credit card utilization rates 
  Figure 7 presents evidence on the evolution of credit card and home equity patterns from 
2005 through 2009. Availability under credit lines is a useful measure of credit supply given 
evidence that total available access on a credit line reflects a bank’s willingness to lend (see 
Gross and Souleles (2002)). While the size of a credit line can also reflect consumer demand, the 
utilization rate (total line less borrowed portion) can offer suggestive evidence of whether supply 
or demand is driving variation in credit limits. If a decline in credit limits leads to a sharp rise in 
utilization rates, then the decline in credit limits is more consistent with a shift in credit supply 
than credit demand. As the top left panel shows, credit card availability increased dramatically 
during the early part of the recession from the fourth quarter of 2006 to the third quarter of 2008. 
In other words, while home equity and mortgage credit markets became significantly tighter in 
the early part of the recession, credit card availability was expanding. 
As the middle left panel shows, high leverage growth counties took advantage of these 
increased limits by borrowing heavily on credit cards during the early part of the recession. 
Recall that these same counties experienced a sharp increase in defaults and unemployment and a 
sharp decrease in house price growth, residential investment, and auto sales during this same 
time period. The sharp relative growth in credit card debt from the fourth quarter of 2007 to the 
third quarter of 2008 for high leverage growth counties was either a last attempt to avoid 
defaults, or a final draw down on credit cards before inevitable bankruptcy. 
As the top left panel shows, the financial crisis in the fall of 2008 led to a sharp reversal 
in credit card availability. All counties faced a dramatic reduction in credit card availability, 
which is consistent with a large negative aggregate credit supply shock. 22 
 
As shown in Figure 6A above, both high and low leverage growth counties experienced a 
sharp decline in auto sales and a sharp increase in unemployment after the third quarter of 2008. 
How is the large negative consumer credit supply shock shown in Figure 7 related to this 
pattern? To answer this question, we sort counties based on credit card utilization rates as of the 
fourth quarter of 2006. Counties with high credit card utilization rates are assumed to be more 
reliant on short-term unsecured consumer credit.
9 
The top panel of Figure 8 presents the correlation between the credit card utilization rate 
as of 2006 and the decline in auto sales from the third quarter of 2008 to the second quarter of 
2009. There appears to be a negative correlation, although there is a substantial amount of noise. 
The bottom panel examines the unemployment rate increase from the third quarter of 2008 to the 
second quarter of 2009. There is a very weak positive correlation between credit card utilization 
and the subsequent increase in unemployment. 
Table 7 presents results relating the credit card utilization rate to changes in economic 
outcomes during the recession. As column 1 of Table 7 shows, the credit card utilization rate is 
not related to auto sales growth from the fourth quarter of 2006 to the third quarter of 2008. In 
other words, our initial measure of household leverage appears to be the dominant force early in 
the recession. In column 2, we examine auto sales growth for the entire recession; the credit card 
utilization rate as of 2006 is strongly correlated with the decline in auto sales when we examine 
the entire recession. The magnitude of the coefficient implies that a one standard deviation 
increase in credit card utilization rates as of 2006 is associated with a 1/3 standard deviation 
decrease in auto sales. Household leverage growth from 2002 to 2006 continues to be correlated 
with the decline in auto sales during the recession. Column 3 includes control variables; the 
                                                            
9 The correlation across counties between the increase in the debt to income ratio from 2002 to 2006 and the credit 
card utilization rate as of the fourth quarter of 2006 is statistically significantly negatively correlated. As a result, we 
are able to separately test the household leverage growth channel from the credit card reliant-consumer channel. 23 
 
magnitude of the credit card utilization rate declines, but it remains negative and statistically 
significant at the 10% level. 
In columns 4 through 6, we examine whether credit card utilization rates as of 2006 os 
related to the drop in housing permits or the increase in unemployment. Unlike the evidence on 
auto sales, we find little evidence of a correlation between credit card utilization rates and 
housing construction or unemployment. In other words, there is a large fraction of unexplained 
variation in housing permit growth and unemployment growth, especially after the third quarter 
of 2008. 
B. Alternative channels 
  In this section, we consider other factors that may have been important in explaining the 
cross-sectional severity of the recession across U.S. counties. It is important to emphasize that 
alternative channels must be able to explain the cross-sectional patterns we observe. 
Whenever a financial crisis occurs simultaneously with a severe recession, there is a 
possibility that financial market difficulties have an accelerator effect through business credit 
availability and investment (Bernanke and Gertler (1989)). Indeed, the results in the previous 
subsection suggest a financial accelerator effect through consumer credit supply. However, one 
potential argument against our household leverage channel is a local financial accelerator effect: 
household defaults in a given county led to difficulties in the local banking sector which in turn 
led to a contraction of business credit. The channel was not households cutting back in the face 
of enormous debt burdens and reduced credit availability; instead, financial difficulties in the 
local banking sector led to the economic downturn. 24 
 
  We examine the local financial accelerator hypothesis in Table 8.
10 In columns 1 through 
3, we isolate the sample to 52 counties that have banks in the county with less than 10% of their 
total deposit base in the county. In other words, these counties have almost exclusively national 
banks that are unlikely to have large exposure to the household defaults within the county. 
Among these national bank counties, we see the exact same relation between the increase in 
household leverage from 2002 to 2006 and economic outcomes from 2006 to 2009. It is difficult 
to argue that local banking markets are driving the effect in these counties, given that the banks 
are major national players. 
In columns 4 through 6, we include explicit control variables for charge-offs and net 
income for the banks that have branches in the county. The inclusion of such control variables 
does not change the coefficient estimates on leverage growth from 2002 to 2006. These results 
are inconsistent with the hypothesis that the effect of household leverage on county-level 
outcomes is due to a local financial accelerator operating through the business sector. 
More generally, a common argument for the severity of the recession of 2007 to 2009 is 
an aggregate contraction of credit to businesses. We are skeptical of this view for a number of 
reasons. First, non-residential business investment was the last main component of GDP to move 
in the cycle. As Figure 4 above shows, investment in equipment in software did not register a 
major decline until the fourth quarter of 2008, and the reduction in investment in structures did 
not begin until the first quarter of 2009. While the drop in investment in the last part of the 
recession may have been due to harsh credit conditions, it is just as likely that businesses cut 
investment in response to the dramatic reduction in consumption. 
                                                            
10 Deposit data by county for each bank is constructed using the FDIC Summary of Deposit data. Data on charge-
offs and net income is from Call Report data. 25 
 
Second, businesses were in a much healthier financial situation than consumers as of the 
third quarter of 2008 when the credit crisis began. Indeed, the corporate debt to income ratio 
increased only moderately leading up to the recession (Mian and Sufi (2009b)). A large body of 
research documents how businesses used large revolving credit facilities extended during the 
credit boom to mitigate the impact of the credit crunch (Ivashina and Scharfstein (2009), Gao 
and Yun (2009), Chari, Christiano, and Kehoe (2008)). Survey evidence also suggests that there 
was absolutely no evidence of a credit crunch to small businesses through September 2008 
(Dunkelburg (2008)). 
Third, while consumer defaults have skyrocketed above any level in recent history, direct 
measures of corporate distress were relatively low compared to the 2001 recession, even in the 
heart of the credit crunch in the fall of 2008. Figure 9 shows the fraction of public firms that are 
in violation of a financial covenant in any debt agreement (top panel) and the fraction of public 
firms in payment default of debt agreements (bottom panel).
11 For the 2008 fiscal year (which 
covers firms filing their 10-K at any point from July 2008 to June 2009), the fraction of firms 
that violated a financial covenant is much lower than during the recession of 2001. While 
corporate defaults did eventually skyrocket in the second quarter of 2009, these defaults occurred 
very late in the recession. As of the fourth quarter of 2008, corporate defaults were much lower 
than during the years around the 2001 recession. Both covenant violation and default patterns 
suggest that firms faced less distress than they did in the relatively mild recession of 2001. 
 
Section 5. How Much of the Recession Does Our Model of Household Leverage Explain? 
                                                            
11 The covenant violation data are described in detail in Nini, Smith, and Sufi (2009). The corporate default data are 
from Moody’s Default and Recovery Database. 26 
 
  The severity of the 2007 to 2009 recession is reflected in four aggregate facts: (i) there 
was an extraordinary rise in household defaults from 4.1% to 9.7%, (ii) homeowners experienced 
a 21% drop in house prices, (iii) consumers pulled back sharply on durable consumption, which 
we proxy for with the 36% drop in auto sales, and (iv) the unemployment rate jumped from 4.2% 
to 9.8%.
12 
How much of these four factors can the growth in household leverage from 2002 to 2006 
and the level of consumer reliance on credit card borrowing as of 2006 explain? In other words, 
can the cross-sectional variation in these two measures of household leverage explain most of the 
aggregate fluctuations listed above? 
A simple answer to this question is given by the predicted fluctuations for counties that 
score very low on our two measures of household leverage.
13 For example, if household leverage 
growth from 2002 to 2006 were the only factor responsible for the dramatic increase in defaults, 
then we would predict zero increase in defaults for counties with no growth in leverage from 
2002 to 2006. Using this methodology, our first factor – the growth in household leverage from 
2002 to 2006 – accounts for almost the entire increase in household defaults and the entire 
decline in house prices. This can be seen in column 2 of Tables 2 and 3 where the constant in 
univariate regressions is very close to zero and precisely estimated.
14 
The constant in column 2 of Table 4 suggests that the leverage growth from 2002 to 2006 
alone is not sufficient to explain the entire drop in auto sales from the end of 2006 to 2009. The 
regression predicts a 15% drop in auto sales even in counties for which there was no increase in 
                                                            
12 All of these numbers are calculated using our sample. 
13 By using predicted values, this magnitude assessment ignores unexplained (residual) variation. In other words, we 
compare magnitudes by using the economic outcomes that our model predicts for counties with varying degrees of 
household leverage, and ignoring any “unexplained” variation not predicted by our model. 
14 Counties in the lowest leverage growth decile have a change in the debt to income ratio from 2002 to 2006 just 
above zero. The constant therefore represents an in sample prediction for these lowest decile leverage growth 
counties. 27 
 
household leverage. Given an average drop in auto sales of 36%, this estimate implies that our 
first factor cannot explain 42% (= 15/36) of the overall drop in auto sales. 
However, the specification reported in column 2 of Table 7 shows that adding our second 
factor – the credit card utilization rate as of 2006 – significantly adds to our predictive power of 
explaining the auto sales decline. How much of the overall decline in auto sales can our two 
combined factors explain? This question can be answered by looking at the predicted auto sales 
decline for counties that score low on both household leverage growth and the credit card 
utilization rates. Counties in the bottom decile of household leverage growth from 2002 to 2006 
and credit card utilization rate in 2006 have mean values for these two variables of 0.166 and 
0.198, respectively. Using the coefficient estimates from column 2 of Table 7, the predicted auto 
sales decline for a county in the lowest decile of both our factors is 3.5% (= -0.281*0.166-
3.051*0.198+0.616). In other words, our model predicts almost no change in auto sales in the 
absence of the observed changes in leverage growth and the credit card utilization rate.
15    
Comparatively, our measures of household leverage within the model cannot explain as 
much of the aggregate rise in unemployment. For example, the estimates in column 2 of Table 6 
imply that even counties with no increase in household leverage from 2002 to 2006 would have 
seen a rise in unemployment of 4.7%. Household leverage growth therefore explains only 1.1% 
of the 5.6% increase in aggregate unemployment. The estimates in column 6 of Table 7 show 
that the credit card utilization rate does not add much power in explaining the rise in 
unemployment. 
                                                            
15 We focus on the lowest decile counties, because we prefer to avoid out of sample predictions. We should point out 
however, that household leverage growth and credit card utilization rates are strongly negatively correlated with a 
correlation coefficient of -0.31. Nonetheless there exist counties that lie in the intersection of bottom deciles for the 
two factors. 28 
 
However, the limitation of our cross-sectional measures of household leverage in 
explaining the aggregate rise in unemployment should not be seen as a failure of household 
leverage itself. Our earlier results – as well as aggregate patterns - show that a large part of the 
decline in GDP is driven by a drop in consumption, and in particular durable consumption. The 
drop is much more pronounced in areas that were more levered, either in terms of leverage 
growth or dependence on credit card borrowing. However, production of consumer goods is 
often not in the same county where consumers are located. As a result, we would naturally 
expect unemployment to be more evenly distributed across the country, even if household 
leverage is the underlying cause of the rise in unemployment. For example, a decline in auto 
sales due to high leverage growth in Florida and California would naturally lead to higher 
unemployment in other states such as Alabama and Michigan. 
As a cautionary note, our exercise is not meant to argue that household leverage 
“predicts” recessions. Instead, we examine only one recession. In this recession, our cross-
sectional statistical model predicts that the increase in mortgage defaults and the decline in house 
prices and durable consumption would have been largely avoided had counties had low measures 
of household leverage as of 2006. 
 
Section 6. Conclusion 
 Understanding economic fluctuations is a central goal of macroeconomics. Our results 
suggest that the sharp increase in household leverage from 2002 to 2006 is closely linked to the 
2007 to 2009 economic recession. Other factors in the financial markets—such as banks’ 
liquidity, the Lehman bankruptcy, and policy uncertainty—may have contributed to the size of 
the downturn. However, our evidence lends support to the hypothesis that the initial economic 29 
 
slowdown was a result of a highly-leveraged household sector unable to keep pace with its debt 
obligations. 
Our results are consistent with the following interpretation: As homeowners realized that 
house price appreciation was no longer sufficient to roll over existing debt, they borrowed 
aggressively from their existing unsecured credit limits, started to default, and, most importantly, 
cut back on durable consumption. These patterns began around the middle of 2006, well before 
the financial market turmoil of August 2007 or the deeper meltdown of the fall of 2008. 
Our interpretation of the evidence is consistent with two other studies that rely on cross-
sectional variation in household leverage. King (1994) examines GDP growth across western 
countries in the 1990 to 1991 recession and finds evidence that countries with higher household 
debt to GDP ratios before the recession had more severe declines in GDP. Glick and Lansing 
(2010) conduct a similar exercise for the 2007 to 2009 recession and find similar results. The 
similarity of the cross-sectional evidence in these three different settings is strongly indicative of 
a close link between household leverage and economic downturns. The weight of the evidence 
suggests the need for more theoretical and empirical research on this potential channel. 
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 Figure 1 
Household Leverage and the U.S. Recession of 2007 to 2009 
The top panel plots the unemployment rate according to the Bureau of Labor Statistics, and the middle panel plots 
GDP growth from NIPA. The bottom panel plots the aggregate household debt to income ratio for the U.S. from 
1977 to 2008. Household debt data come from the Federal Reserve’s Flow of Funds, income represents wage and 
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Weakness of Household Balance Sheets 
The top panel presents default rate data from Equifax and house price data from the Case Shiller 20 MSA house 
price index. The house price series represents the cumulative growth since the fourth quarter of 2005. The bottom 
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Household Defaults and Unemployment 
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House Prices and Unemployment rateFigure 4 
What Components of GDP Moved First? 
The top two panels present investment and consumption data from NIPA. The bottom panel presents monthly retail 
sales data from the Department of Commerce. Each series represents the cumulative growth rate since the fourth 
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Default Rates and House Price Growth in High and Low Leverage Growth Counties 
High leverage growth counties are defined to be the top 10% of counties by the increase in the debt to income ratio from 2002Q4 to 2006Q4. Low leverage 
growth counties are in the bottom 10% based on the same measure. The left panel plots the change in the default rate for high and low leverage growth counties 
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House Price GrowthFigure 5B 
Correlation across Counties of Default Rates and House Prices during Recession with Leverage Growth from 2002 to 2006 
The left panel presents the correlation across U.S. counties of the increase in the household debt to income ratio from 2002Q4 to 2006Q4 and the increase in the 
default rate from 2006Q4 to 2009Q2. The right panel presents the correlation across U.S. counties of the increase in the household debt to income ratio from 
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Debt to Income Increase and House Price GrowthFigure 6A 
Auto Sales, New Home Building, and Unemployment Rates in High and Low Leverage Growth Counties 
High leverage growth counties are defined to be the top 10% of counties by the increase in the debt to income ratio from 2002Q4 to 2006Q4. Low leverage 
growth counties are in the bottom 10% based on the same measure. The left panel plots the growth in auto sales since 2005, the middle panel plots the growth in 
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Change In Unemployment RateFigure 6B 
Correlation across Counties of Auto Sales, New Housing Permits, and Unemployment during Recession with Leverage Growth 
from 2002 to 2006 
The left panel presents the correlation across U.S. counties of the increase in the household debt to income ratio from 2002Q4 to 2006Q4 and the decline in auto 
sales from 2006Q4 to 2009Q2. The middle panel presents the correlation of the increase in the household debt to income ratio from 2002Q4 to 2006Q4 and the 
growth in housing permits from 2006 to 2008. The right panel presents the correlation across U.S. counties of the increase in the household debt to income ratio 
from 2002Q4 to 2006Q4 and the increase in unemployment rates from 2006Q2 to 2009Q2. All y axis variables are winsorized at the 1% level. The sample 
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Debt to Income Increase and UnemploymentFigure 7 
Credit Lines during the Recession 
High leverage growth counties are defined to be the top 10% of counties by the increase in the debt to income ratio 
from 2002Q4 to 2006Q4. Low leverage growth counties are in the bottom 10% on the same measure. The panels of 
this figure present evidence on home equity and credit card limits, draw-downs, and utilization rates from 2004Q4 to 
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Consumer Credit Constraints and the Severe Contraction from 2008Q3 to 2009Q2 
The top panel presents the correlation across counties between auto sales growth from 2008Q3 to 2009Q2 and the 
credit card utilization rate as of 2006Q4. The bottom panel presents the correlation across counties between the 
change in the unemployment rate from 2008Q3 to 2009Q2 and the credit card utilization rate as of 2006Q4. All 
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CC Utilization 06Q4 and UnemploymentFigure 9 
Measures of Financial Distress for U.S. Corporations 
Covenant violation data for U.S. publicly traded corporations are from Nini, Smith, and Sufi (2009). Corporate 
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Number of corporate defaultsTable 1 
Summary Statistics for U.S. Counties 
This table presents summary statistics for the 450 counties in our sample. We include only counties that have at least 
50,000 households as of the 2000 Decennial Census. 
        
 N  Mean  Median  SD  10
th 90
th  
        
Equifax credit bureau/IRS income        
Debt to income increase, ‘02Q4 to ‘06Q4  450  0.775  0.668  0.530  0.256  1.460 
Debt  to  income,  ‘01Q4  450  2.211 2.084 0.533 1.615 2.995 
        
Equifax credit bureau        
Change  in  default  rate,  ’06q4  to  ‘09q2  450  0.043 0.032 0.039 0.010 0.099 
Default  rate,  ‘06Q4  450  0.041 0.039 0.015 0.023 0.058 
Default  rate,  ‘01Q4  450  0.043 0.042 0.016 0.024 0.064 
Fraction with credit score below 660, ‘01Q4  450  0.334  0.318  0.087  0.236  0.457 
Credit  card  utilization  rate,  ‘06Q4  450  0.237 0.234 0.028 0.205 0.276 
        
FHFA house price index        
House price growth, ’06Q4 to ‘09Q2  123  -0.141  -0.072  0.204  -0.450  0.060 
        
R.L. Polk auto sales        
Auto sales growth, ’06Q4 to ‘09Q2  450  -0.323  -0.283  0.272  -0.679  -0.018 
        
Census New Housing Permits        
New house permit growth, ’06Q4 to ‘09Q2  449  -0.692  -0.694  0.461  -1.244  -0.139 
        
Bureau of Labor Statistics        
Change in unemployment rate, ’06Q4 to ‘09Q2  450  0.054  0.050  0.019  0.033  0.080 
Unemployment  rate,  ‘06Q4  450  0.042 0.040 0.013 0.029 0.057 
Unemployment  rate,  ‘01Q4  450  0.052 0.050 0.016 0.035 0.070 
        
Decennial Census        
Total  households,  ’00  (thousands)  450 182 104 246  55  355 
Fraction  black,  ‘00  450  0.093 0.050 0.115 0.004 0.250 
Fraction  homeowner,  ‘00  450  0.708 0.729 0.103 0.589 0.808 
Fraction with high school education or less, ‘00  450  0.301  0.295  0.072  0.213  0.391 
Ln (Median household income, ‘00)  450  10.720  10.714  0.238  10.416  11.042 
Ln(Median home value, ’00)  450  11.690 11.628  0.430  11.194 12.278 
        
Census County Business Patterns        
Employment  share  in  construction,  ‘06Q4  449  0.067 0.060 0.029 0.038 0.109 
Employment share in real estate, ‘06Q4  449  0.018  0.017  0.008  0.010  0.028 
Employment  share  in  finance,  ‘06Q4  449  0.051 0.044 0.028 0.026 0.083 
Employment  share  in  retail,  ‘06Q4  449  0.147 0.147 0.032 0.109 0.189 
Employment share in exports, ‘06Q4  450  1.513  0.000  2.631  0.000  4.986 
        
 
  Table 2 
Household Leverage Increase from 2002Q4 to 2006Q4 and 
Default Rates from 2006Q4 to 2009Q2 
The regression in columns 2 through 5 are weighted by the number of households in the county as of 2000. Column 
5 reports coefficients from the second stage of an IV specification where the change in the debt to income ratio from 
2002 to 2006 is instrumented with housing supply inelasticity of the county as constructed by Saiz (2008). Standard 
errors are clustered by state. 
   
  Dependent variable: Change in default rates, ‘06Q4 to ‘09Q2 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
 Unweighted  Weighted    Weighted  Weighted  Weighted 
IV 
Change in debt to income, ‘02 to ‘06  0.049**  0.058**  0.056**  0.055**  0.093** 
  (0.008) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.025) 
       
Debt to income, ‘01      0.020**  0.015*  0.010 
     (0.006)  (0.006)  (0.010) 
Unemployment rate, ‘06      -0.782  -0.520  -0.986* 
     (0.474)  (0.429)  (0.429) 
Unemployment rate, ‘01      0.850**  0.767*  1.134** 
     (0.313)  (0.301)  (0.349) 
Default rate, ‘06      -0.171  -0.228  -0.486 
     (0.246)  (0.259)  (0.323) 
Default rate, ‘01      1.280**  1.232**  1.642** 
     (0.342)  (0.360)  (0.388) 
Fraction with credit score under 660, ‘01      0.245**  0.239**  0.093 
     (0.075)  (0.082)  (0.131) 
Credit card utilization rate, ‘06      -0.628**  -0.610**  -0.232 
     (0.130)  (0.138)  (0.325) 
Fraction black, ‘00      -0.066**  -0.063*  -0.049+ 
     (0.025)  (0.025)  (0.027) 
Fraction homeowner, ‘00      -0.074*  -0.049  -0.088 
     (0.031)  (0.036)  (0.054) 
Fraction with high school or less, ‘00      0.116*  0.131*  0.241** 
     (0.053)  (0.050)  (0.065) 
Ln (Median household income, ‘00)      0.081**  0.072**  0.104** 
     (0.022)  (0.022)  (0.033) 
Ln(Median home value, ’00)      -0.021+  -0.018  -0.052* 
     (0.012)  (0.012)  (0.021) 
Employment share in construction, ‘06        0.101  -0.059 
       (0.107)  (0.114) 
Employment share in real estate, ‘06        0.770*  0.960* 
       (0.382)  (0.425) 
Employment share in finance, ‘06        0.066  0.066 
       (0.056)  (0.096) 
Employment share in retail, ‘06        -0.048  -0.062 
       (0.062)  (0.094) 
Employment share in exports, ‘06        -0.001  -0.000 
       (0.001)  (0.001) 
Constant 0.005+  0.005  -0.630**  -0.595**  -0.617* 
  (0.003) (0.005) (0.153) (0.153) (0.238) 
Number  of  counties  450 450 450 449 218 
R
2  0.45 0.49 0.76 0.77 0.77 
**,*,+ Coefficient estimate statistically distinct from 0 at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
  Table 3 
Household Leverage Increase from 2002Q4 to 2006Q4 and 
House Price Growth from 2006Q4 to 2009Q2 
The regression in columns 2 through 5 are weighted by the number of households in the county as of 2000. Column 
5 reports coefficients from the second stage of an IV specification where the change in the debt to income ratio from 
2002 to 2006 is instrumented with housing supply inelasticity of the county as constructed by Saiz (2008). Standard 
errors are clustered by state. 
   
  Dependent variable: House price growth, ‘06Q4 to ‘09Q2 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
 Unweighted  Weighted    Weighted  Weighted  Weighted 
IV 
Change in debt to income, ‘02 to ‘06  -0.247**  -0.235**  -0.221**  -0.221**  -0.553 
  (0.024) (0.032) (0.036) (0.035) (0.574) 
       
Debt to income, ‘01      -0.117*  -0.079+  0.076 
     (0.050)  (0.044)  (0.385) 
Unemployment rate, ‘06      -0.985  -0.760  -0.144 
     (1.798)  (2.106)  (2.938) 
Unemployment rate, ‘01      -1.523  -2.007  -4.407 
     (1.365)  (1.359)  (3.122) 
Default rate, ‘06      -2.661  -2.877  3.918 
     (2.061)  (2.223)  (14.229) 
Default rate, ‘01      -0.341  -0.809  -3.204 
     (1.891)  (2.080)  (6.192) 
Fraction with credit score under 660, ‘01      -1.523*  -1.263*  -0.384 
     (0.597)  (0.593)  (1.675) 
Credit card utilization rate, ‘06      4.261**  4.017**  0.602 
     (0.793)  (0.762)  (7.349) 
Fraction black, ‘00      0.262  0.220  0.303 
     (0.226)  (0.220)  (0.490) 
Fraction homeowner, ‘00      0.466+  0.394  0.267 
     (0.230)  (0.249)  (0.816) 
Fraction with high school or less, ‘00      -0.417  -0.345  -0.939 
     (0.309)  (0.291)  (1.065) 
Ln (Median household income, ‘00)      -0.575**  -0.460**  -0.929* 
     (0.149)  (0.141)  (0.409) 
Ln(Median home value, ’00)      0.251**  0.199**  0.615 
     (0.062)  (0.072)  (0.468) 
Employment share in construction, ‘06        -1.132*  0.546 
       (0.456)  (1.563) 
Employment share in real estate, ‘06        -0.790  -1.782 
       (1.449)  (4.917) 
Employment share in finance, ‘06        -0.221  0.801 
       (0.279)  (1.758) 
Employment share in retail, ‘06        0.797  4.587 
       (0.708)  (5.352) 
Employment share in exports, ‘06        -0.004  0.012 
       (0.006)  (0.028) 
Constant  0.097** 0.060 3.069*  2.395* 2.483 
  (0.023) (0.039) (1.206) (0.988) (3.873) 
Number of counties  123  123  123  123  56 
R
2  0.62 0.57 0.79 0.80 0.46 
**,*,+ Coefficient estimate statistically distinct from 0 at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
  Table 4 
Household Leverage Increase from 2002Q4 to 2006Q4 and 
Auto Sales Growth from 2006Q4 to 2009Q2 
The regression in columns 2 through 5 are weighted by the number of households in the county as of 2000. Column 
5 reports coefficients from the second stage of an IV specification where the change in the debt to income ratio from 
2002 to 2006 is instrumented with housing supply inelasticity of the county as constructed by Saiz (2008). Standard 
errors are clustered by state. 
   
  Dependent variable: Auto sales growth, ‘06Q4 to ‘09Q2 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
 Unweighted  Weighted    Weighted  Weighted  Weighted 
IV 
Change in debt to income, ‘02 to ‘06  -0.222**  -0.236**  -0.116*  -0.122*  -0.528 
  (0.035) (0.037) (0.048) (0.051) (0.326) 
       
Debt to income, ‘01      -0.250**  -0.238**  -0.106 
     (0.049)  (0.053)  (0.120) 
Unemployment rate, ‘06      -0.406  -1.469  2.589 
     (2.364)  (2.292)  (3.029) 
Unemployment rate, ‘01      -2.089  -2.009  -3.748 
     (1.389)  (1.373)  (2.880) 
Default rate, ‘06      -0.672  0.078  0.869 
     (2.399)  (2.336)  (3.031) 
Default rate, ‘01      0.430  0.877  -0.906 
     (2.199)  (2.194)  (5.112) 
Fraction with credit score under 660, ‘01      -1.699**  -1.808**  -0.303 
     (0.556)  (0.557)  (1.614) 
Credit card utilization rate, ‘06      1.960*  1.806*  -1.995 
     (0.809)  (0.750)  (3.906) 
Fraction black, ‘00      0.126  0.119  -0.174 
     (0.259)  (0.259)  (0.378) 
Fraction homeowner, ‘00      -0.211  -0.422*  -0.257 
     (0.204)  (0.207)  (0.468) 
Fraction with high school or less, ‘00      0.419  0.230  -0.170 
     (0.424)  (0.443)  (0.834) 
Ln (Median household income, ‘00)      -0.283+  -0.217  -0.435 
     (0.160)  (0.164)  (0.319) 
Ln(Median home value, ’00)      0.178+  0.165+  0.485+ 
     (0.091)  (0.093)  (0.274) 
Employment share in construction, ‘06        -0.237  0.427 
       (0.665)  (1.013) 
Employment share in real estate, ‘06        -2.716  -4.209 
       (2.163)  (3.497) 
Employment share in finance, ‘06        -0.584  -0.738 
       (0.559)  (0.948) 
Employment share in retail, ‘06        0.881  1.465 
       (0.551)  (1.299) 
Employment share in exports, ‘06        0.003  0.004 
       (0.006)  (0.011) 
Constant -0.151**  -0.150**  1.498  1.161  0.081 
  (0.038) (0.053) (1.118) (1.143) (2.386) 
Number  of  counties  450 450 450 449 218 
R
2  0.19 0.19 0.44 0.45 0.25 
**,*,+ Coefficient estimate statistically distinct from 0 at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
  Table 5 
Household Leverage Increase from 2002Q4 to 2006Q4 and  
New Housing Permit Growth 
The regression in columns 2 through 5 are weighted by the number of households in the county as of 2000. Column 
5 reports coefficients from the second stage of an IV specification where the change in the debt to income ratio from 
2002 to 2006 is instrumented with housing supply inelasticity of the county as constructed by Saiz (2008). Standard 
errors are clustered by state. 
  Dependent variable: New Housing Permit Growth 
  ‘06 to ‘08  ’02 to ‘06 
  (1)  (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
  Unweighted Weighted Weighted Weighted Weighted 
IV 
 
Change in D2I, ‘02 to ‘06  -0.262**  -0.263** -0.225* -0.231**  -0.632  -0.094+ 
 (0.074)  (0.078)  (0.099)  (0.085) (0.386) (0.048) 
         
Debt to income, ‘01      -0.357**  -0.328**  -0.157   
     (0.062)  (0.062)  (0.185)   
Unemployment rate, ‘06      -5.146  -7.139  -5.906   
     (6.351)  (5.734)  (6.003)   
Unemployment rate, ‘01      -1.343  -0.771  -2.853   
     (4.294)  (4.065)  (5.055)   
Default rate, ‘06      -3.517  -2.675  -0.448   
     (3.994)  (4.124)  (6.066)   
Default rate, ‘01      -5.039  -4.818  -5.414   
     (5.023)  (5.054)  (6.584)   
Fraction with CS under 660, ‘01      0.233  0.139  0.670   
     (0.995)  (1.076)  (1.961)   
Credit card utilization rate, ‘06      0.597  0.541  -1.816   
     (2.320)  (2.445)  (5.762)   
Fraction black, ‘00      0.436  0.467  0.291   
     (0.401)  (0.383)  (0.392)   
Fraction homeowner, ‘00      0.123  -0.339  -0.273   
     (0.394)  (0.335)  (0.475)   
Fraction with HS or less, ‘00      -0.091  -0.335  -1.121   
     (0.484)  (0.544)  (0.948)   
Ln (Median HH  income, ‘00)      -1.055**  -0.945**  -1.265**   
     (0.217)  (0.235)  (0.419)   
Ln(Median home value, ’00)      0.577**  0.568**  0.834**   
     (0.138)  (0.135)  (0.238)   
Employment share in const., ‘06        0.131  2.055   
       (0.607)  (1.334)   
Employment share in RE, ‘06        -10.055*  -13.952*   
       (4.206)  (6.268)   
Employment share in finance, ‘06        -0.476  -1.708   
       (0.957)  (1.418)   
Employment share in retail, ‘06        1.517  1.510   
       (1.264)  (1.945)   
Employment share in exports, ‘06        -0.002  -0.009   
       (0.008)  (0.016)   
Constant -0.489**  -0.461**  5.139*  4.445*  5.305+  0.041 
 (0.061)  (0.084)  (1.969)  (1.965) (3.060) (0.072) 
Number  of  counties  449  449 449 449 218 449 
R
2  0.09  0.10 0.31 0.32 0.27 0.01 
**,*,+ Coefficient estimate statistically distinct from 0 at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
  Table 6 
Household Leverage Increase from 2002Q4 to 2006Q4 and 
Change in Unemployment Rate from 2006Q4 to 2009Q2 
The regression in columns 2 through 5 are weighted by the number of households in the county as of 2000. Column 
5 reports coefficients from the second stage of an IV specification where the change in the debt to income ratio from 
2002 to 2006 is instrumented with housing supply inelasticity of the county as constructed by Saiz (2008). Standard 
errors are clustered by state. 
   
  Dependent variable: Change in unemployment rate, ‘06Q4 to ‘09Q2 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
 Unweighted  Weighted    Weighted  Weighted  Weighted 
IV 
Change in debt to income, ‘02 to ‘06  0.007*  0.011**  0.008*  0.011**  0.018* 
  (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.008) 
       
Debt to income, ‘01      0.012**  0.013**  0.005 
     (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.005) 
Unemployment rate, ‘06      0.205  0.157  -0.257 
     (0.386)  (0.377)  (0.164) 
Unemployment rate, ‘01      0.321  0.347+  0.093 
     (0.220)  (0.200)  (0.090) 
Default rate, ‘06      0.205  0.178  0.214 
     (0.206)  (0.218)  (0.185) 
Default rate, ‘01      0.116  0.124  0.015 
     (0.179)  (0.178)  (0.194) 
Fraction with credit score under 660, ‘01      -0.000  0.018  0.035 
     (0.046)  (0.042)  (0.050) 
Credit card utilization rate, ‘06      -0.090  -0.102  -0.112 
     (0.106)  (0.110)  (0.123) 
Fraction black, ‘00      0.023  0.017  0.000 
     (0.018)  (0.018)  (0.014) 
Fraction homeowner, ‘00      -0.005  0.021  -0.007 
     (0.025)  (0.026)  (0.018) 
Fraction with high school or less, ‘00      0.064**  0.073**  0.028 
     (0.021)  (0.021)  (0.020) 
Ln (Median household income, ‘00)      0.020  0.014  0.004 
     (0.014)  (0.013)  (0.011) 
Ln(Median home value, ’00)      -0.003  -0.003  -0.007 
     (0.011)  (0.009)  (0.008) 
Employment share in construction, ‘06        -0.065  -0.075 
       (0.044)  (0.046) 
Employment share in real estate, ‘06        0.219  0.005 
       (0.208)  (0.155) 
Employment share in finance, ‘06        0.014  0.056+ 
       (0.046)  (0.032) 
Employment share in retail, ‘06        -0.133*  -0.032 
       (0.054)  (0.037) 
Employment share in exports, ‘06        0.001**  0.000 
       (0.000)  (0.000) 
Constant 0.048**  0.047**  -0.188+  -0.131  0.039 
  (0.003) (0.004) (0.111) (0.104) (0.091) 
Number  of  counties  450 450 450 449 218 
R
2  0.04 0.10 0.30 0.34 0.44 
**,*,+ Coefficient estimate statistically distinct from 0 at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 Table 7 
Consumer Credit Constraints and the Deepening of the Recession from 2008Q3 to 2009Q2 
This table presents coefficient estimates of the effect of credit card utilization rates on auto sales and unemployment. Column 3 (4) restricts the sample to firms in 
the bottom (top) decile counties of the change in debt to income from 2002 to 2006 distribution. The specification reported in column 3 includes the following 
control variables: the unemployment rate as of 2001Q4 and 2006Q4, the fraction of population that is black, the fraction of homeowners, the fraction with a high 
school education or less, and the fraction of employment in construction, real estate, finance, retail and export industries. All regressions are weighted by the 
number of households and standard errors are clustered by state. 
Dependent variable  Auto sales 
growth, 
‘06Q4 to ‘08Q3 
Auto sales growth, 
‘06Q4 to ‘09Q2 
Housing permit 
growth, 
’06 to ‘08 
Unemployment 
rate change, 
‘06Q4 to ‘08Q3 
Unemployment 
rate change, 
‘06Q4 to ‘09Q2 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
        
Change in debt to income, ‘02 to ‘06  -0.194**  -0.281**  -0.264**  -0.287**  0.010**  0.012** 
  (0.023) (0.030) (0.056) (0.080) (0.001) (0.002) 
CC utilization rate, ‘06Q4  -1.066  -3.051**  -1.664+  -1.580  0.034  0.085 
  (0.712) (0.688) (0.866) (1.158) (0.042) (0.083) 
Constant 0.309+  0.616**  -2.282+  -0.065  0.002  0.025 
  (0.181) (0.180) (1.280) (0.313) (0.010) (0.018) 
        
Control  variables?  N N Y N N N 
        
Number  of  counties  450 450 449 449 450 450 
R
2  0.30 0.26 0.37 0.11 0.20 0.11 
**,*,+ Coefficient estimate statistically distinct from 0 at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
  Table 8 
Can the Effect of Household Leverage on Recession Severity be Due to Local Banking Effects? 
The coefficient estimates reported in columns 1 through 3 are from specifications that isolate the sample to counties where the banks have less than 10% of their 
deposits within the same county. Columns 4 through 6 report coefficient estimates from specifications that include measures of bank performance within the 
county. All specifications are weighted by the number of households in the county as of 2000. Standard errors are clustered by state. 
                
  Only counties where banks have <10% local 
deposits 
Include controls for performance of banks in 
county 
  (1) (2) (3)      (4) (5) (6) 
Dependent variable:  Auto sales 
growth, 
‘06q4 to ‘09q2 
New Housing 
Permit Growth, 




‘06q4 to ‘09q2 
   Auto  sales 
growth, 
‘06q4 to ‘09q2 
New Housing 
Permit Growth, 




‘06q4 to ‘09q2 
             
Change in debt to income, ‘02 to ‘06  -0.219**  -0.170**  0.007*      -0.236**  -0.255**  0.010** 
  (0.035) (0.039) (0.003)     (0.036)  (0.064)  (0.002) 
             
Change in charge-offs for banks in county, ’05 to ‘08            -2.334  2.255  -0.061 
          (2.464)  (3.998)  (0.132) 
Change in net income for banks in county, ’05 to ‘08            14.537*  25.300**  -1.133** 
          (5.609)  (8.999)  (0.343) 
Constant -0.172*  -0.558**  0.053**      -0.014  -0.307**  0.039** 
  (0.066) (0.073) (0.005)     (0.062)  (0.089)  (0.004) 
             
Number of counties  52  51  52      450  449  450 
R
2  0.30 0.08 0.10      0.25 0.16 0.18 





  Appendix Table 
20% of Counties in Sample, Ordered by Change in Debt to Income from 2002 to 2006 
(Largest Increase First) 
This table lists every 5
th county in our sample, ordered by the largest increase in the household debt to income ratio 
from 2002 to 2006. There are a total of 450 counties in our sample, and 90 counties in this list. 
     
1 CALIFORNIA,MONTEREY  46 FLORIDA,PASCO 
2 CALIFORNIA,SANTABARBARA  47 KENTUCKY,KENTON 
3 CALIFORNIA,MERCED  48 CONNECTICUT,TOLLAND 
4 HAWAII,HAWAII  49 NEW  MEXICO,BERNALILLO 
5 VIRGINIA,LOUDOUN  50 GEORGIA,MUSCOGEE 
6 FLORIDA,SARASOTA  51 INDIANA,LAKE 
7 OREGON,DESCHUTES  52 WISCONSIN,MILWAUKEE 
8 FLORIDA,MANATEE  53 WASHINGTON,SPOKANE 
9 FLORIDA,CHARLOTTE  54 NORTH  CAROLINA,DURHAM 
10 MARYLAND,MONTGOMERY  55 MISSOURI,JACKSON 
11 FLORIDA,BROWARD  56 MICHIGAN,KALAMAZOO 
12 NEW  JERSEY,OCEAN  57 WISCONSIN,OUTAGAMIE 
13 COLORADO,BOULDER  58 FLORIDA,ALACHUA 
14 MARYLAND,PRINCEGEORGES  59 TEXAS,FORTBEND 
15 FLORIDA,OKALOOSA  60 OHIO,STARK 
16 FLORIDA,CITRUS  61 WISCONSIN,ROCK 
17 NEW  JERSEY,MONMOUTH  62 TEXAS,SMITH 
18 NEW  YORK,ROCKLAND  63 INDIANA,ELKHART 
19 MASSACHUSETTS,HAMPSHIRE  64 KANSAS,WYANDOTTE 
20 COLORADO,ARAPAHOE  65 SOUTH  CAROLINA,YORK 
21 NEW  YORK,RICHMOND  66 SOUTH  CAROLINA,RICHLAND 
22 COLORADO,JEFFERSON  67 NEW  YORK,ALBANY 
23 ILLINOIS,LAKE  68 PENNSYLVANIA,BERKS 
24 FLORIDA,BAY  69 ARKANSAS,PULASKI 
25 NEW  JERSEY,SUSSEX  70 INDIANA,PORTER 
26 MARYLAND,WASHINGTON  71 NORTH  CAROLINA,MECKLENBURG 
27 NEW  JERSEY,UNION  72 KANSAS,SHAWNEE 
28 ALASKA,ANCHORAGE  73 NEW  YORK,RENSSELAER 
29 ILLINOIS,COOK  74 NEW  YORK,BRONX 
30 WASHINGTON,SNOHOMISH  75 ILLINOIS,WINNEBAGO 
31 MAINE,KENNEBEC  76 OREGON,MARION 
32 FLORIDA,MARION  77 TENNESSEE,RUTHERFORD 
33 NORTH  CAROLINA,CABARRUS  78 TENNESSEE,SULLIVAN 
34 INDIANA,MONROE  79 LOUISIANA,EASTBATONROUGE 
35 NEW  YORK,QUEENS  80 PENNSYLVANIA,LEBANON 
36 COLORADO,WELD  81 TEXAS,MCLENNAN 
37 GEORGIA,DEKALB  82 TEXAS,NUECES 
38 MICHIGAN,GENESEE  83 TEXAS,BRAZORIA 
39 NEW  JERSEY,MIDDLESEX  84 TEXAS,TARRANT 
40 MISSOURI,CLAY  85 PENNSYLVANIA,WESTMORELAND 
41 MICHIGAN,OTTAWA  86 ILLINOIS,MACON 
42 ARKANSAS,BENTON  87 ARIZONA,PINAL 
43 UTAH,DAVIS  88 LOUISIANA,RAPIDES 
44 MICHIGAN,MONROE  89 OHIO,RICHLAND 
45 SOUTH  CAROLINA,LEXINGTON  90 TEXAS,ECTOR 
     
 